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NOTE
NOTE, THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL AND
THEIR EXTRADITION DILEMMA
Sheryl A. Petkunas*
The degree to which States parties comply with an extradition
treaty influences relations between those countries, particularly when
political offenses are involved.' As a result of recent domestic devel-
opments, both legal and political, in the United States and Israel, each
State's application of the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty2 is creat-
ing uncertainty as to the Treaty's scope. In applying the Treaty's
political offense exception, the United States Courts of Appeals have
failed to reach a consensus on how to distinguish terrorist acts from
political offenses. Despite this lack of consistent application, the
United States has exhibited a willingness to extradite individuals in
accordance with the Treaty. Israel's ability to meet the terms of the
Treaty, on the other hand, is impaired by domestic legislation prohib-
iting the extradition of its nationals. 3 For instance, Federal Bureau of
Investigation officials await the result of their request to Israel for the
arrest of Robert Manning, a suspect in a string of pipe bomb murders
who has dual United States and Israeli citizenship.4 Israel's refusal to
extradite individuals suspected of crimes in the United States, such as
Manning, would undermine the purpose of the Treaty as well as the
relationship formed between Israel and the United States as a result of
the treaty.
5
Part I of this note will examine the different approaches taken by
the Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits in their application of the
* University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1991.
1. Grooms and Samson, International Law - The Political Offense Exception to Extradition:
A 19th Century British Standard in 20th Century American Courts, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1005, 1007 (1984).
2. Convention on Extradition, Dec. 10, 1962, United States-Israel, 14 U.S.T. 1707, T.I.A.S.
No. 5476 [hereinafter 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty].
3. Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law, § 2, 32 LAWS OF THE
STATE OF ISRAEL 63, 64 (1978) (amending Extradition Law of Aug. 23, 1954, infra note 97).
4. In October 1988, an arrest warrant, the first step in extradition, was issued for Manning.
Spano, Israel Unlikely to Arrest Killing Suspect, L.A. Times, Oct. 22, 1988, § 2 (Metro), at 10,
col. 4. See also Tipping, Charges Dropped in Mail Bombing, U.P.I. Jan. 27. 1989 (NEXIS, Do-
mestic News).
5. Grooms & Samson, supra note 1, at 1007.
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Treaty's political offense exception. Part II will discuss the conflict
that may arise from Israel's application of a domestic law which con-
travenes the purpose of the Treaty. Part III will address both the need
for the United States and Israel to reconcile problems in applying the
political offense exception through renegotiation and the dilemma aris-
ing from the failure of the Israeli government and the Knesset to coor-
dinate policy with regard to the extradition of nationals.
I. POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION: DIVERGENT APPLICATIONS
BY U.S. COURTS
Extradition is one State's surrender of persons accused or con-
victed of crimes to another State so that the requesting State may try
or punish those persons under its own laws. 6 Extradition has three
main purposes: to bring criminals to justice, to promote good bilateral
relations between treaty parties and to prevent a State from becoming
a haven for dangerous persons.7 Absent a treaty, principles of interna-
tional law neither require a State to extradite nor prevent a State from
voluntarily doing so. 8 Treaties create an obligation by specifying the
situations under which the parties are required to extradite
individuals.
In defining extraditable crimes, multilateral and some bilateral
treaties require "double criminality," the principle that the act be ille-
gal in both the State requesting the extradition and the State receiving
the request. 9 Most bilateral treaties contain a list of specific crimes for
which a person may be extradited. '0 The 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition
Treaty lists extraditable crimes in article II.11
Most extradition treaties include a political offense exception.1 2
The exception protects the right of people to rebel against an oppres-
sive government.1 3 It also may protect the person sought against un-
6. M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 107 (6th ed.
1987); L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACTER & H. SMIT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CASE
MATERIALS 885 (2d ed. 1987) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL LAW].
7. Note, Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense Excep-
tion, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 654, 658 n.18 (1986) [hereinafter Political Offense Exception] (citing
Draft Convention on Extradition, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 22, 112-13 (Supp. 1935) (article 5 and
commentary thereto)).
8. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra, note 6, at 885-86 (quoting Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290
U.S. 276, 287 (1933)).
9. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 886.
10. Id.
11. 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, at art. II.
12. Note, In Re Extradition of Atta. Tension Between the Political Offense Exception and
U.S. Counterterrorism Policy, 1 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 163, 167 (1989) [hereinafter Atta
Extradition].
13. Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 661.
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fair treatment by the requesting country and prevent the requested
country from becoming embroiled in another State's domestic con-
flict.1 4 Article VI(4) of the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty pro-
vides exception to extradition when
[tihe offense is regarded by the requested Party as one of a political char-
acter or if the person sought proves that the request for his extradition
has, in fact, been aimed with a view to trying or punishing him for an
offense of a political character.15
Like most extradition treaties,' 6 the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition
Treaty does not define a political offense. Because there is a lack of
international consensus as to what constitutes a political offense and
because the United States has never defined the term by legislation or
treaty,' 7 United States courts have traditionally assumed the role of
interpreting the phrase with the hope of setting forth a politically neu-
tral interpretation based on the facts of each case.'
8
Typically, the United States government has insisted that the de-
termination of what constitutes a political offense be left to the Execu-
tive Branch. U.S. courts have consistently held, however, that this
determination comports with the duty of the courts to interpret a
treaty in accordance with its text as well as 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184.19
Courts have reasoned that application of the political offense exception
involves the kind of factual determinations routine to the process of
judicial interpretation and does not touch upon any foreign policy ele-
14. Id.
15. 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, at art. VI.
16. Atta Extradition, supra note 12, at 166.
17. Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 655-56.
18. Atta Extradition, supra note 12, at 166-67.
19. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986); Eain v.
Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (West
1990) reads:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United States and
any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or any magistrate author-
ized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge of a court of record of general
jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under oath, charging any person found
within his jurisdiction, with having committed within the jurisdiction of any such foreign
government any of the crimes provided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant
for the apprehension of the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice,
judge, or magistrate, to the end that the evidence of criminality may be heard and consid-
ered. Such complaint may be filed before and such warrant may be issued by a judge or
magistrate of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia if the wherea-
bouts within the United States of the person charged are not known. If, on such hearing, he
deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty
or convention, he shall certify the same, together with a copy of all the testimony taken
before him, to the Secretary of State, that a warrant may issue upon the requisition of the
proper authorities of such foreign government, for the surrender of such person, according
to the stipulations of the treaty or convention; and he shall issue his warrant for the commit-
ment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to remain until such surrender shall
be made.
[Vol. 12:204
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ments that are beyond judicial competence. 20
Leaving the determination of the scope of the political offense ex-
ception to the Executive Branch is problematic from a practical stand-
point, given its interest in the extradition process. The United States
State Department's role in the extradition process is primarily one of
prosecutor. 21 It helps the requesting State to formulate its request to
win the approval of a United States court 22 and works closely with the
Department of Justice which controls the extradition litigation. 23 To
prevent those whose extradition is sought from becoming political
pawns, courts typically do not defer to the Executive Branch's judg-
ment regarding any specific extradition request. 24 However, the gen-
eral policy of the Executive Branch does influence courts in
extradition matters. Although the Ninth Circuit has set forth a policy
of neutrality in applying the political offense exception, other courts
have attempted to incorporate the State Department's stance against
terrorism in limiting application of the political offense exception. 25
A. Relative Political Offenses and the Incidence Test
Political offenses are classified as either pure political offenses or
relative political offenses.26 Pure political offenses are crimes commit-
ted against the the state27 and include treason, espionage and sedi-
tion.28 They differ from common crimes,29 such as those listed in
article II of the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, and are not extra-
ditable.30 Relative political offenses are common crimes which would
be extraditable were it not for the fact that they were committed in
20. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 787-90; Eain, 641 F.2d at 513-17.
21. Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441, 1488 (1988).
22. Article IX of the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty provides:
The determination that extradition based upon the request therefor should or should not be
granted shall be made in accordance with the domestic law of the requested Party and the
person whose extradition is sought shall have the right to use such remedies and recourses as
are provided by such law.
1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, at art. IX.
23. Kester, supra note 21, at 1488.
24. Id. at 1484-89.
25. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981); Ahmad v.
Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
26. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 202-03 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated, 355 U.S. 393
(1958).
27. Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradition Law, 48
VA. L. REV. 1226 (1962).
28. Id. at 1234. See also Garcia-Mora, Treason, Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses
Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. Prr. L. REV. 65 (1964).
29. Littenburg, The Political Offense Exception: An Historical Analysis and Model for the
Future, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1196, 1198 (1990).
30. Id. Article II of the Treaty reads as follows:
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furtherance of a political objective. 3t Definitional problems arise with
this latter classification. Because the limits to the political offense ex-
ception have not been defined, it has been difficult for the courts to
distinguish a common crime from a political offense and a political
Persons shall be delivered up according to the provisions of the present Convention for
prosecution when they have been charged with, or to undergo sentence when they have been
convicted of, any of the following offenses:
1. Murder.
2. Manslaughter.
3. Malicious wounding; inflicting grievous bodily harm.
4. Rape.
5. Abortion.
6. Unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under the age specified by the laws of both the
requesting and requested Parties.
7. Procuration.
8. Willful non-support or willful abandonment of a minor or other dependent person
when the life of that minor or that dependent person is or is likely to be injured or endan-
gered.









17. Receiving any money, valuable securities or other property knowing the same to
have been unlawfully obtained.
18. Fraud by a bailee, banker, agent, factor, trustee, executor, administrator or by a
director or office of any company.
19. Forgery, including forgery of banknotes, or uttering what is forged.
20. The forgery or false making of official documents or public records of the govern-
ment or public authority or the uttering or fraudulent use of the same.
21. The making or the utterance, circulation or fraudulent use of counterfeit money or
counterfeit seals, stamps, dies and marks of the government or public authority.
22. Knowingly and without lawful authority making or having in possession any in-
strument, tool, or machine adapted and intended for the counterfeiting of money, whether
coin or paper.
23. Perjury; subornation of perjury.
24. Arson.
25. Any malicious act done with intent to endanger the safety of any persons travelling
upon a railway.
26. Piracy, by the law of nations; mutiny on board a vessel for the purpose of rebelling
against the authority of the Captain or Commander of such vessel; by fraud or violence
taking possession of such vessel.
27. Malicious injury to property.
28. Smuggling.
29. False swearing.
30. Offenses against the bankruptcy laws.
31. Offenses against the law relating to dangerous drugs.
Extradition shall be granted for any of the offenses numbered 27 through 31 only if the
offense is punishable under the laws of both Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding
three years.
Extradition shall also be granted for attempts to commit or conspiracy to commit any of
the offenses mentioned in this Article provided such attempts or such conspiracy are punish-
able under the laws of both Parties by a term of imprisonment exceeding three years.
Extradition shall also be granted for participation in any of the offenses mentioned in
this Article.
31. Id.
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offense from a terrorist act with any consistency. 32
Traditionally, the "incidence test," first introduced in In re Cas-
tioni,3 3 has served as a guideline for determining relative political of-
fenses. 34 The incidence test is comprised of two prongs: first, there
must be a political uprising or disturbance existing at the time of the
alleged crime; second, the act committed must be incidental to or in
furtherance of a political objective. 35 United States courts have added
requirements to the classic formulation of the incidence test. For ex-
ample, the court in Quinn v. Robinson set out a geographical require-
ment that the act in question be committed in the territory where the
uprising is occurring, not merely in the general area, in order for the
exception to be applicable. 36 District Judge Sprizzo added a balancing
component in In re Doherty, listing for consideration the following fac-
tors: "the nature of the act, the context in which it is committed, the
status of the party committing the act, the nature of the organization
on whose behalf it is committed, and the particularized circumstances
in the location where the act takes place."
' 37
Decisions from the Second, Seventh and Ninth Circuits illustrate
the varied approaches taken in applying the incidence test. The Sev-
enth Circuit approach attempts to eliminate terrorist acts from the
political offense exception by articulating a subjective test to determine
the legitimacy of the political goal and the means used to achieve it.
The Ninth Circuit supports a position of neutrality when it comes to
examining the means used to further political objectives. On August
10, 1990, the Second Circuit upheld U.S. District Judge Weinstein's
decision to extradite a United States citizen to stand trial in Israel for a
1986 bus bombing on the West Bank.38 Judge Weinstein of the East-
ern District of New York introduced the use of the Law of Armed
Conflict to distinguish a political offense from a terrorist act.
39
1. Eain v. Wilkes - Seventh Circuit Test
The Seventh Circuit criticized literal application of the traditional
incidence test for being both underinclusive and overinclusive. The
32. Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 656.
33. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
34. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 795 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 808.
37. In re Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1984). These considerations are similar
to those suggested in Part liA. of this note. Unfortunately, Judge Sprizzo gave little justifica-
tion for focusing on the fourth consideration at the expense of the others.
38. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
39. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
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test is underinclusive because it will not apply to political crimes oc-
curring outside the period of the political disturbance and thus fails to
protect some acts which are nevertheless committed to further a polit-
ical objective. It is overinclusive because it affords protection to a
broad range of acts in furtherance of a political objective, including
most terrorist acts.4° The Seventh Circuit limited the incidence test by
inquiring whether the political objective and the means used to further
it were legitimate. In Eain, the State of Israel requested the extradi-
tion of Abu Eain, a West Bank resident and Palestine Liberation Or-
ganization ("PLO") member, for a 1979 bombing which killed two
and injured more than thirty in the Israeli city of Tiberias.41
In affirming the order of extradition by the district court, the Eain
court examined the legitimacy of both the method and motivation be-
hind the act and made three determinations. First, in assessing the
legitimacy of the tactics used, the court distinguished between organ-
ized military conflict and single, violent acts committed by dispersed
PLO forces.42 Second, while admitting that assessment of the motive
will not alone decide whether an act is a political offense, the court
nevertheless made an assessment of motive and found that PLO activ-
ity in question was intended to uproot Israel's social structure, rather
than its political structure. 43 Third, the court ruled that regardless of
the political objective, the "indiscriminate bombing of a civilian popu-
lation" did not qualify as a political offense."
The Eain test, aimed at curbing the possibility of the United States
becoming a safe haven for terrorists, has been criticized for encourag-
ing courts to make the kind of foreign policy determinations usually
made by the State Department. 45 The Eain court justified the limita-
tions it imposed by pointing out that terrorist activity "does not conve-
niently fit the categories of conflict with which the courts and the
international community have dealt in the past."'46 The same may also
be said of contemporary domestic revolutionary tactics. While the in-
cidence test as applied in Quinn may fail to recognize the growing
40. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 519 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981) (quoting
Lubet & Czackzes, The Role of the American Judiciary in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 193, 203-04 (1980)).
41. Eain, 641 F.2d 504.
42. Id. at 519-20.
43. Id. at 520.
44. Id. at 520-21.
45. See Note, Terrorist Extradition and the Political Offense Exception: An Administrative
Solution, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 177-78 (1980) [hereinafter Terrorist Extradition]; Political Of-
fense Exception, supra note 7, at 668-70.
46. Eain, 641 F.2d at 520.
[Vol. 12:204
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terrorist threat on the international level, by contrast, the Eain test's
subjective standard threatens the policy behind the political offense ex-
ception by legitimizing some methods of revolt and rejecting others.
47
2. Quinn v. Robinson - 9th Circuit Neutrality Approach
In Quinn v. Robinson, a divided three-judge panel of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals asserted a policy of neutrality in its applica-
tion of the incidence test, refusing to limit the test with inquiry into
the methods used to further a political objective. 48 The court refused
the United Kingdom's request for the extradition of a member of the
Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), allegedly involved in a 1975 bomb-
ing,49 under the United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty. 50
While Judge Reinhardt, writing for the court, recognized the legiti-
macy of efforts to exclude acts of terrorism from the exception, he
refused to make a judgment on the tactics used to further the IRA's
political goals, stating that "not all politically-motivated violence un-
dertaken by dispersed forces and directed at civilians is international
terrorism and not all such activity should be exempted from the pro-
tection afforded by the exception." 51
The court specifically rejected the Eain court's inquiry52 into the
legitimacy of both the political goal asserted and the means used to
achieve the goal. The Quinn court stated that a proper application of
the incidence test would, in fact, exclude international acts of terror-
ism. 53 However, the Quinn approach has been accused of affording
protection to most terrorist acts because of its neutral stance with re-
gard to the methods used to pursue a political objective.5 4 Judge
Duniway, who wrote a concurring opinion in Quinn, preferred the
Eain analysis because the Quinn majority test protects attacks on
47. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
48. Quinn, 783 F.2d 776.
49. Quinn, 783 F.2d 776.
50. Extradition Treaty, Oct. 21, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
51. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 805. The court further elaborated:
[I]t is not our place to impose our notions of civilized strife on people who are seeking to
overthrow the regimes in control of their countries in contests and circumstances that we
have not experienced, and with which we can identify only with the greatest difficulty. It is
the fact that these insurgents are seeking to change their governments that makes the polit-
ical offense exception applicable, not their reason for wishing to do so or the nature of the
acts by which they hope to accomplish that goal.
783 F.2d at 804.
52. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
53. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 776.
54. Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 52.
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civilians.15
3. Ahmad v. Wigen - Judge Weinstein's Use of the Laws
of Armed Conflicts
U.S. District Court Judge Weinstein rejected the Ninth Circuit
policy of neutrality. He asserted in Ahmad v. Wigen, a case brought in
the Eastern District of New York, that the Quinn decision ignored the
fact that a victim's status as a civilian has been a significant factor in
the political offense equation since the Nineteenth Century.56 The or-
der in Ahmad was to extradite Mahmoud El-Abed Ahmad, a natural-
ized citizen of the United States also known as "Atta," to stand trial in
Israel for a 1986 bus bombing in the West Bank. 57 The April 1986
attack by three men using Molotov cocktails and automatic weapons
resulted in the death of the bus driver and injury to a passenger.
58
Atta was a suspected accomplice in the attack.59
Dissatisfied with the result reached by applying only the two-
pronged incidence test, Weinstein acknowledged a need to limit the
political offense exception to exclude acts inconsistent with interna-
tional standards of conduct,6° but also emphasized the need to prevent
courts from expanding their power of inquiry. 61 Instead of adopting
the Seventh Circuit's subjective test set out in Eain, Judge Weinstein
chose to restrict the incidence test by distinguishing terrorist acts from
political offenses. He declined to follow the application by another
district court judge62 of the military rules of engagement, which are
the restrictions a government places on its own armed forces at a par-
ticular time and place.63 Judge Weinstein instead distinguished a ter-
rorist act from a political offense by application of the Law of Armed
Conflict, "the body of international law governing all armed conflict
and all nations," 64 embodied in Protocol I to the Geneva Conven-
tions.65 The incidence test, as applied with this added restriction,
55. Quinn, 783 F.2d at 819.
56. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
57. Id.
58. Reuter Library Report (Aug. 14, 1990).
59. Id.
60. Ahmad, 726 F.Supp. at 401-05.
61. Id. at 405.
62. Judge Weinstein's ruling was based upon a petition for a writ of habeus corpus. On
habeas corpus review, mixed determinations of fact and law, such as the political offense excep-
tion, are reviewed de novo. Id. at 397 (citing Quinn, 783 F.2d at 791).
63. In re Extradition of Atta, 706 F.Supp. 1032, 1042-43 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
64. Ahmad, 726 F.Supp. at 405.
65. Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 (1977), reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1391 (1977) [hereinafter Protocol I].
[Vol. 12:204
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would define crimes committed in violation of the laws of armed con-
flict as extraditable regardless of any political motivation.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Judge Weinstein's
extradition order on August 10, 1990.66 The court rejected Atta's
claim that the bombing was a political act covered by the "political
offense" exception to the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, deciding
that an attack on a commercial bus carrying civilian passengers was
not a political offense. It stated plainly: "Political motivation does not
convert every crime into a political offense."'67 The court was silent as
to whether it would specifically follow Judge Weinstein's limitation of
the incidence test, saying only that the analyses of both Judge Wein-
stein and Judge Korman were persuasive and in line with the stance of
the State Department. 6
8
What is surprising about Judge Weinstein's selection of the Law of
Armed Conflict to limit the incidence test is the extent to which such
an application gives rise to the same kind of problems encountered
with application of the rules of military engagement. Judge Korman's
analysis was criticized for incorporating the rules into the political of-
fense exception context because of their design for military conflict
between nations, not civil strife between a government and its own
people. 69 Any use of organized military procedure seems unusual in
the context of a political offense exception, a primary goal of which is
to recognize the right of people to rebel against a government. 70
Judge Weinstein's use of the Laws of Armed Conflict embodied in
Protocol I is also ironic in that neither the United States nor Israel has
ratified the Protocol. Weinstein conceded that the United States had
not ratified Protocol I because it did not agree with the Protocol's defi-
nition of "wars of determination."' 7' He maintained, however, that
Protocol I represented a "developing consensus on substantive and
procedural due process" of which American courts were entitled to
take account of in interpreting a treaty.72 Although the Protocol ap-
plies to "armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial
domination and alien occupation," 73 the kind of organized military
66. Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
67. Id. at 1066.
68. See id. at 1063.
69. Atta Extradition, supra note 12, at 196-97.
70. Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 662.
71. Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389, 406 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
72. Id.
73. Protocol I, supra note 65, at 1397 (art. 1(4)).
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warfare to which the laws refer ignores the prevalence of certain civil
rebellion tactics which have emerged in this century.
For example, the Protocol adopts a broad definition of "civilian.
'74
Under the Protocol, a civilian is one who is not recognizable as be-
longing to the organized armed forces of a party to the conflict.75 The
definition of "civilian" includes members of militias and volunteer
corps apart from the armed forces only if they have a "fixed distinctive
sign recognizable at a distance," bear arms openly and "conduct oper-
ations according to the laws and customs of war."' 76 Under the Laws
of Armed Conflict, then, the only acceptable targets of revolutionary
activity would be the organized forces of the target government. Such
a standard is problematic in that it may be impossible in a number of
situations for a people to successfully stage a rebellion if their only
legitimate targets are the better equipped, better trained and better or-
ganized government forces.
A second difficulty is that the flexibility inherent in the Laws of
Armed Conflict, as with the rules of engagement, prevents their use as
a predictable standard for courts. The nature of the rules of engage-
ment makes it impossible for the government to impose the same
74. In Protocol I, article 50, "civilian" is defined as
any person who does not belong to one of the categories of persons referred to in Article 4
(A) (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention [defined in Article 2 at page 1397 as Geneva
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949] and in Article
43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be
considered to be a civilian.
Protocol I, supra note 65, at 1413 (article 50(l)). Article 4(A) of the Third Convention reads as
follows:
A. Prisoners of war, in the sense of the present convention, are persons belonging to one of
the following categories, who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias
or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, including those of
organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating
in or outside their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such
militias or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance movements, fulfil the
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and customs of
war.
(3) Members of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a government or author-
ity not recognized by the Detaining power.
(6) Inhabitants of a non-occupied territory, who on the approach of the enemy sponta-
neously take up arms to resist the invading forces, without having had time to form
themselves into regular armed units, provided they carry arms openly and respect
the laws and customs of war.
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, opened for signature Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 138.
75. Id. at art. 4(A)(I).
76. Id. at art. 4(A)(2).
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preplanned set of rules upon troops in every military conflict.77
Although some general principles may apply in every situation, the
details concerning acceptable modes of conduct will vary with the cir-
cumstances.78 The Laws of Armed Conflict are similarly designed.
The language of Protocol I, article 48, to which Judge Weinstein re-
fers, sets out a straightforward rule against attacks on civilians:
In order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population
and civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distin-
guish between the civilian population and combatants and between civil-
ian objects and military objects and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives.
79
However, the flexibility of article 57(2), which lists the means of
complying with article 48 through precautionary measures, suggests
that article 48 is a general articulation of an interest in protecting civil-
ians that will prevail only insofar as the chaotic nature of warfare per-
mits. Article 57 describes an indiscriminate attack as one which
causes excessive civilian fatalities in light of the political objective, 80
and it requires doing what is feasible under the circumstances to make
sure that a target is not civilian. 81 The flexibility of article 57(2) recog-
nizes that in some situations attacks which cause the death of civilians
will be necessary to accomplish military objectives. Article 48 is thus
substantially qualified by article 57. This suggests that there may be
consensus as to the goal of protecting civilians, but not necessarily as
to the extent to which such a goal is to be enforced. If article 48 is
diluted with consideration of other factors in its original context, then
one can hardly say that there exists a consensus to apply it as a pre-
dictable standard in the context of extradition.
B. Assessment of Tests
With respect to the Eain court's assessment of the political objec-
tive, it is important to note that the West Bank conflict has evolved
into more than dispersed rock-throwing activity aimed against the so-
cial structure. The Intifadah, the uprising on the West Bank that be-
gan in December of 1987, has created a core of leadership within the
Occupied Territories which has been organizing protest to Israeli oc-
cupation. 82 The protest has taken the form of strikes, with participa-
77. THE ARMY LAWYER, July 1988, at 20.
78. Id.
79. Protocol I, supra note 65, at 1412.
80. Id. at 1416 (article 57(2)(1)(a)(i-ii)).
81. Id. at 1416 (article 57(2)(a)(iii)).
82. See Abu 'Amr, Notes on Palestinian Leadership, MIDDLE EAST REP., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at
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tion numbering in the tens of thousands, boycotts of Israeli goods and
demonstrations in major cities.83 These leaders whom the Intifadah
has pushed to the forefront are imprisoned, deported or are placed
under house arrest or administrative detention.
84
The Quinn test and the use of the Laws of Armed Conflicts have
their own deficiences. Use of the Laws of Armed Conflict to limit the
exception fails to acknowledge the political character of non-military
crimes. The Quinn court supported inclusion of non-military offenses:
"It is clear that various 'non-military' offenses, including acts as dispa-
rate as stealing food to sustain the combatants, killing to avoid disclo-
sure of strategies, or killing simply to avoid capture, may be
[political]."' 85 Giving protection only to attacks on the military may,
in ignoring the "realities of contemporary domestic revolutionary
struggles," be thwarting the primary purpose of the political offense
exception by placing serious impediments on the ability of peoples to
rebel against oppressive regimes. 86 In acknowledging the existence of
a wide range of legitimate non-military tactics of revolt, the Quinn test
also protects terrorist acts.
The predicament of the circuit courts stems from competing inter-
ests. The courts must interpret treaty terms which are mired in polit-
ical policy while respecting the Executive Branch's dominion over
political questions. The courts are given little guidance in interpreting
the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty's political offense exception.
Efforts by Congress to amend the extradition process and clarify the
meaning of political offense faded in the early 1980's.
87
The Supreme Court could decide to settle any discrepancies in the
differing approaches offered by the circuit courts, but such a decision
seems unlikely before a renegotiation of the treaty takes place given
that the last time the Supreme Court addressed the political offense
exception issue was in 1896.88 Moreover, a true solution would re-
83. Paul, Israel and the Intifadah. Points of Stress, MIDDLE EAST REP., Sept.-Oct. 1988, at
13.
84. Abu 'Amr, supra note 82, at 23.
85. Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776, 810 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
86. Id.
87. S. 1940, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REC. S17, 607 (1985). Reform of the Extradi-
tion Laws of the United States. Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1983). Extradition Act of 1981: Hear-
ings on H.R. 5227 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); Hearings on S. 1639 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1981).
88. See Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U.S. 502 (1986). In Ornelas the Supreme Court held habeas
corpus improper when there is sufficient evidence to establish criminality for extradition and the
crime is not political. Kester, supra note 21, at 1476 n.197 (citing Ornelas, 161 U.S. at 509, 512.)
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quire more than choosing one of the criticized tests offered by the cir-
cuit courts. The Court's task of forming a new test would be
facilitated by new developments emerging from a renegotiation of the
treaty, assuming such renegotiation takes into account the discrepan-
cies arising from application of the exception.
II. LEGAL AND POLITICAL BARRIERS TO EXTRADITION OF
ISRAELI NATIONALS
Despite the confusion among United States courts over application
of the political offense exception, the United States has been making
extradition decisions in accordance with the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradi-
tion Treaty. Israel, however, has not been able to reciprocate. Do-
mestic developments in Israel on legal and political fronts do not
reflect Israel's original intent to abide by the Treaty when it comes to
the extradition of its nationals. While the Second Circuit has ordered
the extradition of Atta, United States prosecutors await the results of
their request for the arrest of Robert Manning, a West Bank inhabit-
ant with dual United States and Israeli citizenship who is sought for
the 1980 bomb killing of Patricia Wilkerson. 89 An arrest warrant, the
first stage of extradition, was issued in Israel for Robert Manning in
1988,90 but the Israeli government failed to act on a request by United
States prosecutors to arrest Manning." Manning is also a suspect in a
string of pipe bomb murders92 thought to have been carried out by the
Jewish Defense League in 1985. 91 One victim was Alex M. Odeh, the
Western Regional Director of the American-Arab Anti-Discrimina-
tion Committee, in Santa Ana, California.
94
The fear of becoming a haven for those who commit crimes abroad
has influenced the United States in its negotiation of new extradition
treaties. 95 The Israeli government shared this concern at the time of
the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty negotiations. In spite of the
fact that many extradition treaties and the domestic law of many
89. Suspected along with Manning are his wife Rochelle, and William Ross, a real estate
broker. Charges were dropped against Ross and Rochelle Manning, who was arrested in Los
Angeles in 1988 while disembarking from a plane arriving from Israel, after a deadlocked jury
caused a federal judge to declare a mistrial. Robert Manning was subsequently indicted. Tip-
ping, supra note 4.
90. Spano, supra note 4.
91. Tipping, supra note 4.
92. Spano, supra note 4; Tipping, supra note 4.
93. Friedman, The California Murder that Israel is Sweeping Under the Rug, L.A. Times,
May 13, 1990, sec. M (Opinion), at 5, col. 1.
94. Id.
95. Kester, supra note 21, at 1475 n.192.
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states except citizens from extradition agreements, no such provision
was included in the Treaty, nor did one exist under Israeli law at the
time the Treaty was negotiated. 96 The resulting language of article IV,
states plainly, "[A] requested Party shall not decline to extradite a
person sought because such person is a national of the requested
Party."'9
7
In 1962, there was further assurance Israel would extradite its own
nationals since its domestic law provided for extradition of alleged
criminals, national or not, so long as there was a reciprocal agreement
with the requesting State. 98 Moreover, the law's drafters made it pos-
sible for the government to conclude new agreements without any fur-
ther act of the Knesset, despite insistence by Knesset members in
having a say in the approval of international agreements. 99
In 1978, however, the Knesset enacted an amendment to the 1954
Extradition Law to forbid the extradition of Israeli nationals. The
Knesset created the following exception:
2. In the Extradition Law, 5714-1954-
(1) the following section shall be inserted after section 1:
IA. An Israeli national shall not be extradited save for an offence
committed before he became an Israeli national.'1o
The 1978 amendment defies article IV of the Treaty and ignores the
1954 Extradition Law's direction to leave the creation of such excep-
tions to the treaty-making process. 101 The question of which law takes
precedence arises from this stark conflict, and the question must be
answered in the absence of an Israeli constitution.
As a rule, the Israeli government's control over the treaty-making
process is virtually exclusive.' 0 2 It may negotiate, sign and ratify a
treaty without consulting the Knesset, whose participation is at the
government's discretion. 0 3 Although the Government has occasion-
ally submitted treaties affecting relations between Israel and its neigh-
96. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 889.
97. 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, at 1710.
98. See Extradition Law of Aug. 23, 1954, § 21, 8 LAWS OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL 144, 147
(1954). The law states the following:
21. Where, in an agreement concerning extradition, it has been stipulated between Israel and
a foreign state -
(1) that only a part of the offences set out in the Schedule shall be extradition offences in
respect of that state; ... the stipulation shall be followed, notwithstanding the provisions of
this Law or of any other Law.
Id. at 147.
99. S. SAGER, THE PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 200-01 (1985).
100. Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment of Enactments) Law, supra note 3, § 2.
101. Extradition Law of Aug. 23, 1954, supra note 98, § 21, at 147.
102. S. SAGER, supra note 99, at 200.
103. Id.
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bors for parliamentary ratification, 1 4 generally the government does
not share this treaty-making power with the Knesset.10 However, in
order to become part of the domestic law, treaties require confirmation
by the Knesset, the supreme governmental authority by virtue of its
power to enact the basic laws in lieu of a constitution. 106 In accord-
ance with traditional British constitutional usage, the provisions of in-
ternational treaties do not become effective as domestic law by the
mere fact of enactment in the international realm.10 7 If a treaty is
intended to change domestic law, or requires changes in domestic law
in order to become effective, the changes must be made through the
ordinary channels by which domestic law is enacted.10 8 The 1954 Ex-
tradition Law, by allowing for extradition in the event that a recipro-
cal agreement exists between Israel and the requesting State, appears
to serve the same purpose as a subsequent adoption by the Knesset of
the treaty. 109
Israeli courts apply the rule of lex posterior derogat priori, or last-
in-time rule, in situations where the Knesset intends to repeal a prior
law, either expressly or impliedly, by enacting a law in contradiction
to the first."I0 Therefore, the 1978 amendment to the Extradition Law
barring extradition of Israeli nationals would take precedence over the
1954 Extradition Law's original provision extending extradition to na-
tionals in the event that a reciprocal agreement exists between Israel
and another country."I ' The 1978 amendment, coupled with mount-
104. Id. at 201. They include "the disengagement of forces with Syria in 1974, the 1975 Sinai
agreement with Egypt, the Camp David accords in 1978, the peace treaty with Egypt in 1979,
and the agreement with Lebanon in 1983." Id.
105. Id.
106. E. RACKMAN, ISRAEL'S EMERGING CONSTITUTION 1948-51 98 (1955); S. SAGER, supra
note 99, at 200.
107. U.N. LEGAL DEP'T OF THE SECRETARIAT, LAW AND PRACTICES CONCERNING THE
CONCLUSION OF TREATIES, at 67, 71, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/3, U.N. Sales No. 1952.v.4
(1952).
108. Id. at 71.
109. The 1954 Extradition Law passed by the Knesset reads:
2. A person as aforesaid may be extradited if -
1) an agreement providing for reciprocity as to the extradition of offenders exists be-
tween Israel and the state requesting his extradition (hereinafter: "the requesting
state"); and
2) he is accused or has been convicted in the requesting state of an offence of a non-
political character and which, had it been committed in Israel, would be one of the
offences set out in the Schedule to this Law....
Extradition Law of Aug. 23, 1954, supra note 98, at 144.
110. E. LIKHOVSKI, ISRAEL'S PARLIAMENT 87 (1971).
111. See Extradition Law of Aug. 23, 1954, supra note 98, § 2, at 144.
Federal prosecutors argued for a denial of bail for Rochelle Manning in the 1988 Wilkerson
trial for the reason that she could rejoin her husband in Israel, fearing Israel would refuse extra-
dition on grounds of the domestic law. Spano, U.S. Judge Signs Release Order for Israeli Accused
in Bombing, L.A. Times, Nov. 24, 1988, § 1, at 40, col. I. After U.S. District Judge Dickran
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ing political pressures, may force the courts to deny extradition in
spite of the intentions that the Israeli government had when it entered
into the 1962 Treaty with the United States." 2
Israeli courts are not likely to challenge the Knesset's enactment of
the 1978 amendment in contradiction to both the Treaty and the 1954
Extradition Law. A notion of legislative supremacy exists between the
Knesset and the courts;" 3 a relationship exists that is similar to that
between the British Parliament and courts. Thus the Israeli courts are
generally deemed to exercise no judicial restraint on the Knesset's law-
making power. " 4 If the doctrine of judicial review of legislation exists
in Israel, it is in exceptional cases.' 'I
As an alternative to addressing the domestic law, there is the ques-
tion of whether the Israeli government may use the West Bank issue to
create a jurisdictional bar to extradition, thus avoiding the real issue of
a potential breach of the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty." 6 If
Israel could successfully base its refusal of extradition requests on its
lack of jurisdiction in the West Bank instead of its domestic law, it
may not be necessary to address the conflict between the 1962 Treaty
and the domestic law in the Manning case. Because the State Depart-
ment will not recognize Israel's jurisdiction over the West Bank, the
extradition request for Manning asks that the Israeli government
arrest Manning within the pre-1967 borders." 7 Israel contends it
lacks the resources to monitor Manning's movement up until he
reaches the border." 18 According to the Israeli sources of federal pros-
ecutors, the Israeli government will not arrest Manning so long as he
remains in the West Bank.' '9 However, an Israeli government spokes-
Tevrizian refused to set bail for Rochelle Manning because of the risk that she might flee, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered release with the condition that Manning wear an elec-
tronic tracking device. Id.
112. There is a question whether or not political pressures will force the Israeli government
to refuse the extradition of Manning in breach of the 1962 Treaty. Robert I. Friedman, who has
written a book on Jewish Defense League (JDL) founder Rabbi Meir Kahane, believes that
although the Justice Department has spent five years amassing evidence to convict Robert Man-
ning for the murder of Alex Odeh, an extradition request would meet with "a firestorm of protest
from right-wing legislators" in Israel. Friedman suggests that the Israeli government's incom-
plete responses, or lack of response, to FBI requests for information about suspects may arise
"not out of love for the JDL trio, but because many Israelis view those who slay Arab-American
supporters of the Palestine Liberation Organization or alleged Nazis as heroes. That makes
Israel's compliance with an extradition request very difficult." Friedman, supra note 93.
113. E. LIKHOVSKI, supra note 110, at 78-79.
114. Id. at 78.
115. Id. at 91.
116. Spano, supra note 4.
117. Friedman, supra note 93.
118. Id.
119. Spano, supra note 4.
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man denied that Manning's residence in the West Bank would be a
relevant issue. Provided that Manning's extradition is approved, Man-
ning will be arrested anywhere in Israel, including the West Bank, the
spokesman said. 20 Ilan Mor, consul for press and information at the
Israeli Consulate in Los Angeles, agreed that if and when Israel ap-
proved the extradition, Manning could be arrested on the West Bank;
"the West Bank has an importance as a topic in a political dispute but
not in a legal process."'
121
Regardless of whether the jurisdiction issue or the domestic prohi-
bition of extradition of nationals will serve as the basis for Israel's re-
fusal to extradite Manning, the current state of affairs reflects little of
the original concern of the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty over
safe harbors for criminals in either country; rather it increases the
probability of the West Bank becoming such a haven for those who
engage in terrorist tactics.
III. REVITALIZING THE 1962 EXTRADITION TREATY
A. Clarification of the Political Offense Exception
Renegotiation of the 1962 Treaty appears at this point inevitable.
Without the parties actually enjoying the heart of the bargain, for
which they expended the effort of negotiation, the written word means
little. Renegotiation, if conducted before relations between the parties
sour, may salvage the bargain by redefining the goal and rerouting the
means by which it is to be reached.
Abolition of the political offense exception is not necessary, nor is
it desirable. It has been suggested that abandonment of the political
offense exception will allow the requested State to remain neutral
during a civil uprising because systematic extradition of all offenders
without regard for political motivation will prevent having to choose
sides. 122 This argument addresses only the policy of neutrality behind
the political offense exception and ignores the policy of non-
interference with legitimate political action against a government.
Severe restrictions on the definition of the political offense excep-
tion may have the same result as abolishing the exception. The negoti-
ations for a supplement to the 1972 United States-United Kingdom
Extradition Treaty 123 produced a new, narrow definition of the polit-
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Political Offense Exception, supra note 7, at 664.
123. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972, United States-United Kingdom, 28 U.S.T. 227,
T.I.A.S. No. 8468.
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ical offense exception in the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Sup-
plementary Extradition Treaty 24 which some claim is an "important
step in the battle against terrorism"'' 25 and which others believe is, in
effect, an "evisceration" of the exception. 26
The United States and the United Kingdom negotiated the Supple-
mentary Treaty in the wake of three United States cases in which sus-
pected Provisional Irish Republican Army ("PIRA") terrorists who
had committed violent acts in the United Kingdom and Ireland
avoided extradition by seeking protection under the political offense
exception.127 The Supplementary Treaty prevents United States
courts from basing a refusal of extradition on the political offense ex-
ception when certain violent crimes are involved. 28 Article 1 of the
Supplementary Treaty lists certain crimes to be automatically ex-
cluded from the political offense exception. 29 Subparts (a) through
124. Supplementary Extradition Treaty, June 25, 1985, United Sates-United Kingdom, S.
EXEC. REP. No. 17, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1985), reprinted in 24 I.L.M. 1105-09 (1985) [here-
inafter Supplementary Treaty].
125. Sofaer, The Political Offense Exception and Terrorism, 15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 125
(1986).
126. Blakesly, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 15 DEN. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1986).
127. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); In re Doherty, 599 F.Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1984); In re McMullen, Mag. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
128. Groarke, Revolutionaries Beware: The Erosion of the Political Offense Exception Under
the 1986 United States-United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1515, 1516 (1988).
129. Article I of the Supplementary Treaty reads:
For the purposes of the Extradition Treaty, none of the following offenses shall be regarded
as an offense of a political character:
(a) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of
Aircraft, opened for signature at The Hague on 16 December 1970;
(b) an offense within the scope of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts
against the Safety of Civil Aviation, opened for signature at Montreal on 23 September
1971;
(c) an offense within the scope of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, opened
for signature at New York on 14 December 1973;
(d) an offense within the scope of the International Convention against the Taking of Hos-
tages, opened for signature at New York on 18 December 1979;
(e) murder;
(f) manslaughter;
(g) maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm;
(h) kidnapping, abduction, false imprisonment or unlawful detention, including the taking
of a hostage;
(i) the following offenses relating to explosives:
(I) the causing of an explosion likely to endanger life or cause serious damage to prop-
erty; or
(2) conspiracy to cause such an explosion; or
(3) the making or possession of an explosive substance by a person who intends either
himself or through another person to endanger life or cause serious damage to
property;
(j) the following offenses relating to firearms or ammunition:
(1) the possession of a firearm or ammunition by a person who intends either himself or
through another person to endanger life; or
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(d) exclude of the crimes listed in some multilateral conventions from
the exception. Subparts (b) through (k) automatically exclude the
types of common crimes that previously may have been covered under
the exception provided there was political objective. Subpart (1) ex-
cludes attempts to commit the crimes listed in (a) through (k).13
0
Concern over the increase in terrorism provided a strong rationale
for the Supplementary Treaty. One factor, in particular, was the fail-
ure of the United States to procure the provisional arrest by way of its
bilateral treaties with Italy and Yugoslavia of Mohammed Abbas, the
suspected Palestinian leader of the Achille Lauro hijacking.' 3' A bi-
lateral extradition treaty's effectiveness is questionable when its polit-
ical offense exception provides protection to blatant terrorist acts. The
Supplementary Treaty contained a new definition of the exception
which was designed to discourage terrorists from committing violent
acts with the belief that they would receive protection from the excep-
tion and to prevent the United States from serving as a haven for
criminals fleeing the law of their own countries. 1
32
One criticism of the Supplementary Treaty has been that it under-
mines the traditional role of the courts in determining questions of law
and fact concerning individual freedom.' 33 One critic of the Supple-
mentary Treaty believes that the courts are competent to fulfill this
task alone, contending that "the distinction between the killing of an
off-duty, civilian clothed military person during the hijacking of a ci-
vilian aircraft, and a firefight during a civil war seem significant
enough for the courts to distinguish."' 134 This criticism is answered by
the argument that the role of the courts is to interpret existing law and
that a change in the definition of the political offense exception does
not usurp judicial power, but is lawmaking that is aimed at facilitating
the task of interpretation.
135
The more valid criticism of the Supplementary Treaty is that
although the attempt to clarify the application of the political offense
(2) the use of a firearm by a person with intent to resist or prevent the arrest or detention
of himself or another person;
(k) damaging property with intent to endanger life or with reckless disregard as to whether
the life or another would thereby be endangered;
(I) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses.
Supplementary Treaty, supra note 124, at art. 1.
130. Id.
131. Sofaer, supra note 125, at 125.
132. Id. at 125, 132-33.
133. Blakesley, supra note 126, at 118.
134. Id. at 123.
135. Lubet, Extradition Unbound: A Reply to Professors Blakesley and Bassiouni, 24 TEx.
INT'L L.J. 47, 58-59 (1989).
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exception is commendable, the use of per se rules to do so is short-
sighted.' 36 The use of the political offense exception is altogether pro-
hibited with regard to the per se exceptions in the Supplementary
Treaty. 137 The fact that such per se rules prohibit any inquiry into the
circumstances surrounding the crime may not be as desirable as it may
sound, even with respect to the most atrocious of crimes.1 38 At-
tempted murder of an oppressive dictator who is guilty of mass abuse
of human rights is a violent crime against the person, but may be polit-
ically justified.
In considering whether such per se rules would have a place in a
supplement to the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, one may draw
a distinction between stable democratic States and those less stable.
Without denying the possibility of civil uprisings occurring in stable
democratic States, it is easier to justify per se rules in these States be-
cause the political offense exception will more likely than not be used
as a terrorist loophole. In less stable areas where uprisings are more
frequent, automatic extradition without consideration of political
objectives, such as the Intifadah, would often work results in contra-
diction with the policies behind the political offense exception.
139
Another drawback of supplementing the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradi-
tion Treaty with automatic extraditable offenses is that the timing of
such a legal decision may crucially impact United States foreign rela-
tions with countries in the Middle East other than Israel. With re-
spect to the Supplementary Treaty with the United Kingdom, it was
contended that the real purpose of the limits in the political offense
exception was to aid the United Kingdom in suppressing IRA activi-
ties. 140 If the United States were to agree with Israel to implement a
similar limit on the political offense exception at a point when the
Arab-Israeli conflict on the West Bank is in full flame, it would
threaten foreign relations with other countries in the Middle East.
Such a decision might strengthen relations with Israel, but other
nearby States would view the surrender of virtually all suspects by the
United States to Israel, regardless of political motive, as taking sides in
the West Bank conflict.
136. Van den Wyngaert, The Political Offense Exception to Extradition: How to Plug the
"Terrorists' Loophole" without Departing from Fundamental Human Rights, 19 ISRAEL Y.B. ON
HUM. RTS. 297, 304 (1989).
137. Id. at 306.
138. Id. at 304.
139. Id. at 307.
140. Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the U.S.
and the UK - A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law and Policy,
15 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255, 264 (1987).
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It has been suggested that normative rules, rather than automatic
exemptions, be used to limit the political offense exception. 141 For ex-
ample, the European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism pro-
vides for normative considerations as well as per se rules.142 Although
the Convention lists crimes which fall outside the political offense ex-
ception, it allows parties to make a reservation which allows courts to
review normative considerations before extraditing those who have
committed a listed crime. Such considerations include "whether it
created a collective danger for the life, physical integrity or liberty of
the person, whether it reached persons foreign to the motives behind it
or whether particularly perfidious or cruel means were used for its
accomplishment."
43
Assuming normative standards are preferable to per se rules for the
purpose of curtailing- the use of the political offense exception by ter-
rorists, another problem arises with respect to uniformity in foreign
relations. If the United States and Israel were to adopt normative
rules as guides for the courts, such a policy decision would vastly differ
from the approach taken with the Supplementary Treaty with the
United Kingdom. Different policies applied by the United States to
different States may hamper foreign relations. 144 If, for example, the
United States were to refuse to abide by per se exceptions with respect
to Israel, Israel may feel that the United States is unwilling to afford
the Israeli government the same degree of confidence that it affords the
United Kingdom. There is nevertheless a strong argument that lack of
uniformity in foreign policy with those States which are stable democ-
racies and those which are not may be desirable. 14  In stable, demo-
cratic States the propensity to use the political offense exception as a
means to avoid extradition for terrorist crimes is greater. 146 In less
stable States, a broader interpretation of the exception will prevent ex-
traditions of those involved in legitimate political uprisings.
The question arises whether the use of normative standards will
create the same kinds of problems encountered with the court endeav-
oring to create their own standards. One commentator stated that use
of the normative rules would "plant us squarely in the territory of
141. See Van den Wyngaert, supra note 136, at 306.
142. European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No.
90, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 1272 (1976) [hereinafter Terrorism Convention].
143. Van den Wyngaert, supra note 136, at 306 (citing article 13 of the Terrorism Conven-
tion, supra note 142).
144. Id. at 281.
145. Sofaer, supra note 125, at 132.
146. Id.
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policymaking.. ... 147 On the other hand, application by courts of a
single standard which fits the expectation of both State parties is pref-
erable to a haphazard evolution of a variety of judicially created tests.
Moreover, the margin of divergence would be narrowed when courts
apply the same list of normative considerations. The same set of nor-
mative standards may increase a tendency by the courts to follow simi-
lar tracks of reasoning, encouraging more uniformity in decisions.
B. Improbable Change in Israel's Domestic Law
Assuming termination or suspension, in full or in part, of the 1962
U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty were an option for the United States
under customary law,' 48 such a decision would harm relations with
Israel and weaken efforts to curb terrorism in both States. Moreover,
deletion by renegotiation or reciprocity of article IV, which requires
the extradition of one's own nationals, 49 would harm United States
interests. The United States policy of extraditing nationals is not
merely a concession to encourage other Party States to do the same,
but also a measure to protect United States citizens from those who
seek haven in the United States after committing crimes abroad.
A simple solution to Israel's domestic law prohibiting the extradi-
tion of nationals seems to be a bargain reached between the United
States and Israel for a rescission of that law, but such a bargain seems
unlikely. In light of the conflict over the Occupied Territories, current
sentiment may call for Israeli courts to grant more leniency to nation-
als who have killed slain PLO supporters than courts would afford in
the United States.' 50 In addition, the Israeli government may argue
147. Lubet, supra note 135, at 59.
148. Article 60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/
27 (1969), 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969), reprinted in L. HENKIN, R. PUGH, 0. SCHACHTER,
AND H. SMIT, BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW CASE AND MATERI-
ALS, 281 (1980), addresses termination and suspension of a treaty by the nonbreaching party.
The European Court of Justice has interpreted article 60 as a reflection of customary law. F.
Kirgis, Some Lingering Questions about Article 60 ofthe Vienna Convention on the Law of Trea-
ties, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 549, 550 (1989) (citing Legal Consequences for States of the Contin-
ued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council
Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16, 47 (June 21, 1971); In Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction
of the ICAO Council (India v. Pak.), 1972 I.C.J. 46, 47 (Aug. 18, 1972). While it is agreed that
under customary international law a nonbreaching party may, in some circumstances, exercise a
right of termination or suspension, it is unclear when breach of one article of a treaty gives rise to
this right. See Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on Armistice Agreements be-
tween Israel and various Arab states in 1949, 11 SCOR, Supp. Apr.-June 1956 at 34-35, U.N.
Doc. S.3596, at 6-7 (1956), reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 6, at 484. See also
Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913) (Supreme Court held that executive branch had waived
its right to suspend its own performance with regard to extraditing nationals according to an
extradition treaty with Italy because it had ignored Italy's prior violation of the treaty).
149. 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty, supra note 2, at 1710.
150. See Friedman's discussion, supra note 112.
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against rescission on the basis that Israel's domestic extradition law
fulfills the spirit of the 1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty because the
law has two faces. True, nationals may not be extradited, but the 1978
amendment to the 1954 Extradition Law also provides the courts in
Israel the power to try under Israeli law nationals who have commit-
ted offenses abroad. '51 From the perspective of the United States, this
second face to Israel's extradition law fails to salvage the part of the
1962 U.S.-Israel Extradition Treaty which the first face destroys,
namely the assurance that those who commit crimes in the United
States will be dealt justice in United States courts according to United
States law.
Even if there were an incentive to reach a compromise with the
United States with regard to extradition of nationals, the Israeli gov-
ernment may not be able work such a change within its own system.
Executive powers lie with the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and the
Israeli inner cabinet does have the final say on foreign affairs deci-
sions.' 52 The executive is, however, controlled by political parties who
rule in the Knesset. 53 The Prime Minister does not hold office by way
of direct election, but by being the leader of a political party who has
gained the support of the majority in the Knesset. 154 Prime Minister
Shamir's administration is supported by the right-wing Likud party,
which holds a bare majority in the Knesset. 55 The political parties,
themselves, have bent to the will of smaller, extremist religious par-
ties. 156 Israel's two largest political parties, centrist Labor and Likud,
are of "paralyzingly equal strength" and have solicited support from
the smaller religious parties to gain a political edge.1
57
Voters have been calling for reform of the political situation in
Israel because "the system doesn't work. The Prime Minister cannot
make decisions." 5 8 The Knesset has the power to reform the system,
151. Offences Committed Abroad (Amendment to Enactments) Law, § 1, supra note 3, at
63.
(1) the following section shall be inserted after section 4:
4A. (a) The Courts in Israel are competent to try under Israeli law an Israeli national
or resident of Israel who committed abroad an act which had it been committed in
Israel, would be one of the offences included in the Schedule to the Extradition Law),
5714-1954.
152. ABC-Clio, Inc. (Sept. 25, 1990).
153. T. Phelps, Israeli Government Still at Standstill, N.Y. Newsday, June 5, 1990 (Nassau
and Suffolk edition).
154. ABC-Clio, Inc., supra note 152.
155. The Christian Science Monitor, July 27, 1990, at 18 (Opinion).
156. Phelps, supra note 153.
157. Id.
158. Id. (quoting Ehud Sprinzak, professor of political science at the Hebrew University in
Jerusalem and reform leader.)
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exercising supreme governmental authority through its power to enact
the basic laws until a constitution is set in force. 159 It is unlikely, how-
ever, that the Knesset will do so. To maintain support from the reli-
gious groups who are strengthened by the current system, the two
Likud and Labor parties have had to agree to avoid from electoral
change. 160
Until internal political reform takes place in Israel, whether by im-
plementation of direct elections or by other means, any agreement the
United States reaches with the Israeli government for rescission of do-
mestic law will not be reliable. The Israeli government cannot fulfill
international obligations without the Knesset's cooperative restraint
from counteracting foreign policy with domestic law.
159. Id.
160. Id.
